Book Review: W.G. Beasley’s JAPANESE IMPERIALISM 1894-1945


Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 Review

Book Cover

In the space of 50 years, Japan built an empire that stretched from northern Manchurian down to the tip of Australia. Though its existence proved ephemeral, this was a staggering accomplishment for an island nation that had remained largely (though not completely) disconnected from the Western world until the mid-19th century and had only begun to modernize in 1868. In Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945, W.G. Beasley provides an overview of Japanese territorial expansion and imperialism, beginning with the Sino-Japanese War and ending with Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. In Beasley’s own words, the thesis of this book is as follows; “I do not believe the human impetus towards imperialism needs explaining…What the character of a society, or the international circumstances with which it has to deal, does indeed determine the timing and direction of the impetus, the degree of its success or failure, the kind of advantages that are sought, the institutions that are shaped to give them durability…That is what I propose to examine with respect to Japan” (Beasley, 13). This thesis struck me as vague and somewhat ill-defined. Essentially Beasley does not intended to examine why Japan attempted to carve itself an empire out of East Asia but how it did so. Much of this book is merely a summary of the conventional narrative on the subject with exhaustive references to names and dates. Ultimately, Beasley does not substantially contribute to the historical debate on the subject and merely synthesizes existing lines of thought. Upon turning the last page, the reader knows nothing more than the standard facts and is left to wonder what the point of picking up the book was in the first place.

That said, this book is a very well-written piece of historical scholarship. It’s greatest strength is Beasley’s ability to highlight the differences between Western and Japanese imperialism and he touches on this point throughout the book. Japanese imperialism is fundamentally different from Western imperialism for a number of reasons. First, Japan’s motives for adopting imperialist policies were quite different. According to the orthodox Western explanation, imperialism is an economic, and often exclusively capitalist, phenomenon and fueled by a search for new markets to absorb a country’s excess capital. The words of Lenin provide the most archetypal example, “Imperialism is the highest form of capitalism…the inevitable product of capitalism in its monopoly stage” (Beasley, 2). Beasley points out that while these explanations fit the British imperialist model rather well, they are inadequate at explaining the motivations of other, less-industrially advanced countries that also pursued territorial expansion. Japan’s quest for empire cannot be described as ‘the highest form of capitalism’ because the island nation often suffered from a lack of capital during this period. Instead, Japan pursued an expansionist policy to secure its position in the world. Put simply, Japanese imperialist ambition “was a logical response to…living in an imperialist world” (Beasley, 9).  The Meiji government saw a clear connection between national security and empire and saw imperialism as the best way to escape European control and secure Japanese autonomy. Due to these security concerns, imperialism quickly took root in Meiji Japan and, with the help of politicians, journalists and military officials, by the 1930s the Japanese public had come to see imperialism as a necessity if the country wished to avoid complete economic disaster (Beasley, 190).

Korea was not blessed with a good geographic location...one day it's the Japanese, next China, then Russia.

Initially, Japan considered their colonies as areas to produce the necessary agriculture and foodstuffs for export back to the home islands and as a way to absorb Japan’s rapidly expanding population. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, Japan’s plan for its empire was significantly expanded and deviated even further from the Western model. Japan adopted a number of policies (such as the five year plans) to extensively develop the manufacturing and railway industries within their colonies. This was strikingly different from “the standard [Western] ‘imperialist’ doctrine that the role of dependencies is to provide the homeland with food for its workforce and raw materials for its manufacturing industries” (Beasley, 213). Western imperialist powers had very little to gain from developing manufacturing in their colonies due to the distance separating them. Even if Britain, for example, had developed a munitions or rail-stock industry in India, the cost of shipping such heavy manufactures back to the British Isles would have eliminated any potential profit. Japan’s close proximity to Korea, Taiwan, and China made such activities potentially very profitable.

I agree with Beasley’s assessment of the roots of imperialism in Japan and his assertion that Japanese imperialism is different from Western imperialism. However, by separating Japan from the ‘orthodox’ interpretation, Beasley implies that all Western forms of capitalism are the same, or very similar. This line of reasoning is potentially extremely misleading because it is clear that countries adopt imperialist policies for a wide variety of reasons and motivations. Perhaps Britain was motivated by economic concerns, but Germany clearly wished to expand its empire to increase its international prestige and Russia had always sought territory that possessed the coveted warm-water port. Therefore, while Japanese motivations were very different from many Western countries, Japanese imperialism is not inherently unique. It is also important to remember that mono-causal explanations are always insufficient because they fail to take into account the many disparate influences that exist within a nation.

It is unfortunate that Beasley does not examine in more detail how the newly designed structure of the Meiji state influenced Japan’s turn towards militarism and expansion. It would be informative to examine how the strong influence of the system of emperor-worship (tennōsei) influenced the operations of the Meiji state, which rigidly insulated the bureaucracy and military from popular control and subordinated them directly under the authority of the emperor and allowed a small group of statesmen, military officers, and business leaders to create a monopoly of power. Nor does Beasley examine the emergence of ultranationalism, how it reinforced Japan’s imperialist policies, and why Japan abandoned diplomacy as a tool to achieve its foreign policy goals.

Beasley focused most of his research on official documents and memorandums from the Japanese government. He is clearly a well-trained historian and his use of primary sources is thorough and impressive. However, the breadth of his sources leaves something to be desired. Official documents issued by the Japanese government were often slapdash, schizophrenic pieces that expressed a variety of disparate viewpoints and were not intended to clarify or define official policy. Such documents were usually an attempt to placate demands, both international and domestic. With this in mind, it is clear that official documents can only go so far in explaining the actions and objectives of the Japanese imperial institution. Therefore, Beasley’s argument can almost be described as a ‘state-centric’ approach to examining the subject of Japanese imperialism.

1937 Ad for a Vinyl Record of Prime Minister Konoe’s Speech “The Resolve of the Nation’s People in This Time of Crisis”

A key element of the book is Beasley’s examination of the bureaucratic and administrative systems of the Japanese colonial regimes. While this approach effectively explains the integration of Manchuria and Korea into the Japanese empire, it becomes increasingly inadequate as Japan extended its influence deeper into Southeast Asia during the 1930s. As explained by Beasley, “The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was not a blueprint so much as a ‘vague aspiration’ cobbled together to serve short-term goals”(247). In other words, territorial expansion became less a realization of long-term historic objectives dictated by clear government policies and more a means to accommodate short-term needs. By the 1940s, Japan had extended its empire well beyond its military and financial capabilities. Japan lacked the capital for overseas development, lacked an adequate transportation system to provide an effective infrastructure, a domestic market to absorb its resources, and a surplus of manufactured goods to provide it with exports. Plans to develop heavy manufacturing in both Korea and Manchuria, the colonies were still viewed primarily as sources of foodstuffs and raw materials for Japanese industry. Furthermore, Ishiwara’s Five Year Plan was blocked by both the increasingly disruptive nature of Chinese nationalism and the Pacific War. Ultimately, the “scale of conventional bombing demonstrated that the enemy’s [the United State’s] ability to destroy Japan’s industrial heartland from the air and made possession of an empire an irrelevance”(Beasley, 250).

Rally for the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere

Despite the rhetoric of cooperation and equality found within many of these official documents, Japanese imperial rule was always brutal, repressive, and never upheld the ideals of pan-Asian brotherhood. Such inequality is highlighted by the nature of the colonial administrations and educational systems. The Japanese founded schools in their colonies and occupied territories and forced colonial subjects to learn Japanese and adopt Shinto and Confucian practices. Within Korea and Taiwan, use of native languages was prohibited and indigenous education systems were dismantled. The claim that Japanese expansion was driven by a desire to liberate and aid other Asian countries wears thin upon examination of the harsh treatment of civilian populations by the Imperial Army. The brutal authoritarian control of Korean, manifested in locked factories, forced labor, and compulsory education receive no attention and the rape of Nanking receives a cursory nod. In their essay “Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development: A Critique,” Haggard, Kang and Moon explain, “[Japanese] imperial strategy was built around a pattern of industrialization dominated by a handful of foreign firms…exploiting cheap energy and natural resources, and making a limited contribution to both local value added and employment” (Haggard et. al, 871). Clearly not a social historian, Beasley does not describe the reality of Japanese rule as experienced by the average ‘colonial subject.’ However, by treating the assertions found in official documents as real and legitimate and not as rhetoric aimed at the pacification of both the Western powers and their own civilization population, Beasley not only understates the racial and cultural differences between Asian countries but also creates a skewed image of both the motives and reality of Japanese imperial expansion.

Finally, I question the way Beasley structured his discussion of the subject. Beasley’s analysis of Japanese imperialism can be divided into three distinct phases; from 1895-1905 the rudiments of empire were put together, between 1905 and 1930 Japanese imperialism became more ‘self-assertive’ and Japan considerably expanded its sphere of influence, and after 1930 the Japanese attempted to displace the Eurocentric imperial system with a ‘Japanocentric system’ of their own devising (Duus, 450-451). I believe that the development of Japanese imperialism should be divided into its pre- and post-1930 phases, with the Great Depression as the linchpin around which the character of Japanese imperialism evolved.

Prior to 1930, Japan considered empire as a way to secure its independence in the face of Western pressures in Asia. It was not seen as an outlet for excess capital, as in the Leninist model, but as a way to achieve national security. Thus, Japan preferred to pursue its economic interests through diplomatic and political channels. Foreign policy was predominantly influenced by business interests and bureaucrats within the Foreign Ministry. Though Japan sought to extend its sphere of influence to included Korea and parts of Manchuria, it was quite willing to conform to an international framework that included the Western powers. Additionally, the central government sought to separate Japan from Asia and become more integrated into the Western system, as demonstrated by its inclusion into the treaty port system and the alliance with Britain and the US in 1902.

The Great Depression and decline of international trade and cooperation in the early 1930s fundamentally altered Japan’s imperial goals. National security could no longer be guaranteed through trade and diplomatic channels. Rather than cooperation, economic autarky seemed the best way to ensure Japan’s continued growth. To this aim, Japan sought to establish a regional trade bloc, first by solidifying control in Korea, supporting the creation of a puppet-government in Manchuria, and eventually aggressively pursuing territory in mainland China.

By organizing the discussion of Japanese imperialism in such a fashion, I believe it better demonstrates the shift in Japanese foreign policy from diplomacy to military action that occurred after the Great Depression and also highlights the shift of power into the hands of the military, which had become more violent and aggressive. Furthermore, Beasley’s outline of Japanese imperialism gives the reader the impression that this was a well though-out policy created and pursued by the Japanese government. In truth, the Japanese government and military were institutions that had great difficultly defining goals, developing plans, and implementing them within their own administrations. Cooperation between these disparate groups was rare and often proved impossible. Any study of Japanese imperialism must acknowledge the haphazard, unplanned nature of its evolution.

Ironically, the strengths of this book are also its weakness. While Beasley clearly intended this book to serve as an overview and introduction to the subject, these characteristics have severely limited the effectiveness of his argument. The book covers a time span far too big for its length. While Japanese imperial expansion lasted for only about 50 years, these years included two emperors, various administrations, several attempted coups, and 3 to 4 different wars (depending on how you count them). In a book of roughly 250 pages, nothing can be examined at great detail, and therefore everything seems lacking. I do not believe that Japanese imperialism can be fully understood without a closer examination of the society and institutions from which it originated. Insubordination within the Imperial Army (and to a lesser extent the navy) played a major role in pushing evermore aggressive imperialist policies into action. Why did these radical elements exist and why was such insubordination tolerated? Why were imperialism and nationalism so interconnected during this period? What was the experience of colonial citizens under Japanese imperial rule? By failing to examine these questions, Beasley weakens his book, which is a fine example of historical scholarship, and condemns it to being just a mere overview of the subject. If this was Beasley’s intention, then I suppose Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 should be considered a success, but it seems an empty one.

Works Cited

Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.

Duus, Peter. “Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 by W.G. Beasley,” Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 14, no. 2, 1988, pp. 449-454.

Stephen Haggard, David Kang, and Chung-in Moon, “Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development: A Critique,” World Development, vol. 25, no. 6, 1997, pp. 867-881.

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Comments (10)

  1. Hikosaemon


    Wow. I had heard that you were a war history buff second hand but this is a book review and a half. In fact, this makes me want to go back and read all your stuff now.

    I have some comments, but I suppose I should lay down all my own qualifiers.

    While I’ve been in Japan 12 years, and was a pretty strong geopolitics/political theory undergrad, and a bit of self reading about Japanese history, I came to Japan with a pretty standard simple western high school based view of Japan and the history of its expansionism:
    – Japan opened up and modernized quickly
    – The Tsar gambled on raising morale with a completely miscalculated war against Japan, that sparked Japanese enthusiasm for proving it could be a military power equal to the west
    – It brutally conquered Taiwan and Korea, and then Manchuria.
    – It stormed out of the League of Nations at being told off about Manchuria, and then set about expanding all the way down through Asia.
    – Japan made a point pretty much everywhere it went of singling out Chinese for special mistreatment.
    – America liberated Asia from Japanese conquest and brutal domination when it dropped the A-bombs on Japan.

    My reading and education since coming to Japan has been non-academic, but based on numerous NHK documentaries, interviews, discussions with friends (mainly revisionists, who tend to enjoy these kinds of discussions with westerners) and various other bits and pieces.

    I have to say my view on Japan as a colonial power is dramatically different now to what it was when I got here, but have gotten the “apologist” tag for counterposing the basic kind of orthodoxy I was brought up to more or less accept that I set out above. I’ve done a google but I can’t find a copy of an illuminating interview I once read I think in the Japan Times with former PM Kiichi Miyazawa who painted an amazingly frank picture of the social conditions in Japan that led to “uncontrolled” expansion beyond Manchuria into China by landless factions within the military opposed by the aristocracy that controlled the military and the colonial enterprises, and the Finance Ministry where he worked at the time, but spurred on by midranking officers of lower classes and the popular press in Japan. He painted a picture that seems to be supported by other Japanese documentaries I have seen covering the time period that the orthodoxy is that when considering the Japanese Empire, you need to draw a very strong line between the period between the annexations of Okinawa, Taiwan, Korea and the colonization of Manchuria, and the domestic chaos in the mid 1930s that led to the Japanese army (as opposed to the Navy) more or less running amok, in spite of unsuccessful attempts by factions of government and the military leadership itself to restrain it, that eventually led to a pro-military government settling in and overseeing it.

    Being from a 19th century colony myself, NZ was a rare exception in the British Empire that gave indigenous Maori British citizenship. The degree of national investment and integration of those territories, and its colony in Manchuria I think highlight Japan’s goals there as going far beyond simple national security and chest thumping (yes, Korea in particular was taken for strategic reasons, but the exercise of colonizing, developing and integrating it was taken quite seriously by Japan). The Manchurian Railway Company is a perfect illustration of how Japan took the western colonial model of setting up national companies and took capitalist goals with that company to an extreme where the MRC was for a time one of the richest companies in the world, and funded the creation of cities more advanced in Manchuria than in Japan that drew millions of Japanese colonists.

    Another point that the NHK account of pre-war colonialism differs in emphasis to the west is with regards to the League of Nations. The only chapters I had ever read before coming here about Japan’s relationship with the League was that when it tried to stop Japan’s brutal installation of a “puppet” regime in Manchuria pretending it was a real country, it stormed out, joined the Nazis and started WWII. The NHK account of Japan’s participation in the League and it’s eventual departure focusses on Japan’s earlier failed attempts at proposing a provision in the League Charter recognizing racial equality that European powers (Britain in particular) opposed due to the risk of becoming dominated by the peoples of the empires they controlled (which wasn’t a problem for Japan who embraced its imperial subjects as citizens, at least up until it freaked out in the 1930s…).
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racial_Equality_Proposal, 1919

    It goes on and on – none of this is of course intended as a proper essay, but I’ve always found it refreshing and surprising to learn that history is seldom as cut and dry favoring one narrative or another as we wish to believe. And before you think I’m going too soft, I lived in Singapore as a kid where the brutality of Japan’s out of control army in WWII is kept alive both in numerous museums and the accounts of the survivors of the occupation there (Singapore got particularly rough treatment by Japan mainly for it being seen as a center of Chinese military and communist resistance at the time).

    On a final bit of geopolitics, not many people seem to realize the “special relationship” Japan has with Indonesia. This goes all the way back to the oil embargo of WWII – the rush southwards was not purely for the glory of Empire. Hostile European powers controlling South East Asia effectively made it impossible for Japan to import oil from outside of Asia – during and ever since WWII, it is a central plank of Japanese foreign policy to make sure that Indonesia is always a friend of Japan. The partnership with Javan nationalists went from skipping hand in hand helping partisans round up Dutch colonists and carrying out pogroms against Chinese in WWII, and in the many thousands of former Japanese troops who voluntarily stayed in Indonesia after WWII to help the partisans fight to stop the Dutch reassuming control. Right up the last I knew 10 years ago, Japan had a policy of matching and wherever possible replacing any efforts by any country to invest ODA in Indonesia.

    The point of all this being that by my understanding, the growth of the Empire kinda had 3 phases:
    1) A phase of relatively “enlightened colonization” and the development and attempted assimilation of near countries up to the 1930s
    2) A period of instability in the 1930s were renegade troops marched beyond Manchuria in hope of “lebensraum” as part of a broader class struggle within the Japanese military and a subtle overthrow of the influence of the aristocrats that ran the military and the finance ministry, during which the US imposed sanctions (this conflicts with western accounts that tend to view the rise of militarism as a consequence of the Meiji Constitutional order, and paints a picture of the war as a consequence of the overthrowing of that system).
    3) The period of rapid conquest of coastal Asia intended to protect Japan from it’s vulnerability to blockades in the region by western powers, with justifications along the way of “liberating” those colonized countries from their white European overlords.

    I guess this is where it is frustrating that there is so little meaningful interaction on this topic between Japanese and Western historians. We are already at a point where these events are now almost gone from living memory, and yet it seems no one made any real attempt along the line to make a proper attempt to reconcile the Japanese account of their own history. I guess this makes the topic all the more interesting for us resident bilinguals.

    Sorry for the embarrassingly long and probably mostly incorrect post. But I really loved your review and your insight. Great stuff.

    Peace

    April 5, 2010
    • constantineintokyo


      Every time you comment on something I’ve posted, I end up giving into the rather embarrassing impulse to blurt out that you are my Japanese-speaking idol. Let me assure you, this time will be no different. I loved reading this comment and I think it is fantastic.

      There is a big gap between the orthodox Western interpretation of imperial Japan and the Japanese perspective. I can really only speak for America here, but when I started studying Japanese history in college there were many moments when I had to pause and just shake my head at how much my high school history classes left out or just got plain wrong. And my high school was probably one of the better ones in the USA. What the standard Western orthodoxy seems to get wrong almost all the time is that A) Japanese imperialism was very very different from Western imperialism (and did extend far beyond ‘chest-thumping,’ you are quite correct) and B) the role that factionalism within the Imperial Army and the divide between high-ranking officers and lower-ranking soldiers from rural areas in Japan played in the events of the 1930s. Japan’s relationship with the League of Nations is usually only mentioned in passing with the Lytton Report (again, you are quite right). As for the American narrative specifically, I am constantly annoyed that Americans seem to have collective amnesia when it comes to remembering that we didn’t fight in the Pacific alone. ABDACOM what? Especially when it comes to engagements in 1942, like Kokoda Track, we like to act like the AIF was never there.

      As for why this gap between Western and Japanese narrative seems to exist…unfortunately I think a lot of it boils down to language. Thanks to your language ability, you have access to a vast amount of books and documentaries that will simply never be available to the English-speaking audience. Cheers for being awesome.

      April 6, 2010
  2. Matt Barrette


    I really enjoyed this post. I can tell you put in a great deal of effort and time into this post. I will be back to read more as you post more!

    June 11, 2010
  3. my 2 cents


    I appreciate the effort you put into your review of this book.

    It seems that you take issue with the premise on which Beasley wrote the book and judge it according to how you wish he had written it. As if Beasley promised one thing, you wanted another, read the book anyway, and were disappointed when he didn’t give you what you wanted. Is this preferable to judging it according to the intent with which it was written?

    I tend to find Beasley’s work lucid and unbiased. But perhaps you want him to take more of a stance?

    Respectfully.

    June 25, 2010
    • constantineintokyo


      Beasley is a fantastic scholar and this book is certainly very good. I suppose my main criticism stemmed from the fact that I wish he had taken more of a stance. But as far as an introduction to the subject of Japanese imperialism, this book is excellent.

      July 13, 2010
  4. Imosaburou


    I didn’t understand well this post though I read a few times using dictionaries.

    I think you understand that not-understandable is a kind of understanding.

    Is this your perspective and do you really believe this?

    “Within Korea and Taiwan, use of native languages was prohibited and indigenous education systems were dismantled. “

    July 18, 2010
  5. Imosaburou


    History of Korean Radio Broadcasting under Japanese Rule
    http://radiofly.to/wiki/?%C4%AB%C1%AF%CA%FC%C1%F7%B6%A8%B2%F1%BB%CB

    The following are some of episodes in each year

    1925
    Experimental Korean Radio Broadcasting started
    Tuesday and Friday in Japanese
    Thursday in Korean
    Sunday in Japanese and Korean
    Korean stage drama by Ms卜恵淑(Korean) and Korean Court Music etc.
    This is the first broadcasting in Korean language in history

    1927
    Started in full swing
    50% in Japanese 50% in Korean
    Registered Radio Set: Japanese Persons1165 sets and Korean Persons 276 sets

    1928
    English Language Course started
    Korean Radio Drama by Korean Performers broadcasted
    Review Comments on Korean Art Exhibition broadcasted

    1929
    Change formation to Japanese 7 and Korean 3 because of increasing programs relayed from Japan to Korea
    Korean Old Stories / Korean Feelings and Customs broadcasted
    Set the Temporary Station at the Korean Expo

    —My comment: held in Soule to exhibit Korean Culture Goods Industries etc. 140 million people visited there according to the Wikipedia—

    1930
    Programs from the US and UK broadcasted

    1931
    All the programs of Korean Court Music decided to be formed by Korean Royal Music Department from this year

    1932
    Employed Korean language announcers for the first time to broadcast Second Broadcasting Channel in Korean or First Channel is in Japanese and Second Channel in Korean
    Registered Radio Set 20,562 sets

    1933
    Second Broadcasting Channel – Korean Language Channel Started
    Korean Language Course started but in three years later ceased

    —My comments: Korean language course for Japanese?—

    1934
    Korean Songs relayed to Japan
    Korean Court Music and Korean Folk Songs relayed to Japan

    1935
    Busan Station Started

    1936
    Registered Radio Set 50,000 sets
    Korean New Year’s Games and Customs relayed to Japan

    1937
    War between China and Japan out broken
    November 3: A program to pray to Imperial Palace Tokyo started

    1938
    Japanese Language Course started
    Chosen Soutokufu set up 1000 Japanese language course schools in Korea.
    Teaching language in Primary Schools restricted in Japanese only
    A speech about the holy bible by a Korean Catholic Father broadcasted

    —My comment: Not restriction but option by schoolmasters. There were text books written in Korean yet. It seems that Japanese schoolmasters selected Korean language course. Meanwhile, Korean schoolmasters preferred to select Japanese course. However, from 1940, Korean language course discontinued. —In order to evaluate this change you must know that educated Korean people had studied Chinese only, not Korean in the Korean history.—

    1939
    Mr 沈友燮 Manager of Second Broadcasting Station decided to resign because his boss instructed him to use Japanese words in Korean’s broadcasting news.

    —My comment: He expressed his objection freely anyway.—

    1940
    Two daily newspapers in Korean were ceased publication. Only Soutokufu’s 毎日新報 remained as a daily newspaper in Korean language

    Second Broadcasting Station – Korean Language Station – became more important accordingly.

    1941
    Communication in Korean over the telephone and telegram between Japan and Korea were restricted. In Japanese only.

    —My comment: People did not have telephone. The telegram was seldom used except big business companies. This must have been security purpose against communists.—

    The Pacific War out broken

    1942
    Change programs to War Time Programs
    VOA in Korean Language broadcasting
    Prohibits use of Korean Language in studying

    —My comment: As mentioned above, the educated Koreans used Chinese, Kanbun in Japanese as Japanese had done it either or Latin in Europe. They did not use Korean language to study something sophisticated. Therefore historically they had no books written in Korean worthy to read for such educated people. Japan had been struggling forming new Japanese in translating various words of European philosophy or technology into Japanese Kanji since Meiji Restoration. China imported many of such words from Japanese. Some examples are: 文明、法律、経済、資本、哲学、理性、科学、物理、分子、原子、質量、共産主義, A lot of Chinese came to Japan to study things new which Japan had adopted from Europe and studied a secret of Japanese success. Chiang Kai-shek and Zhou En-lai were an example. Chiang Kai-shek entered a Japanese pre-military school Tokyo Shimbu Gakkou東京振武学校 and received on the job study in the Japanese Imperial Army. Zhou En-lai stayed in Japan for years and entered Hosei Daigaku as a listener. They both must have spoken and read Japanese of course. The Chinese Independence or Revolution in 1911 led by Japanese readers or speakers who studied in Japan.—

    — Former Korean president Pak Jeong-hui or Park Chung-hee was graduated from the Japanese Military School in the third top of the class and entered Manchurian Army became First Lieutenant.—

    —Incidentally, Sun Yat-sen got married in Tokyo during his exile to Japan and the wedding ceremony was held at Hibiya Matsumotoro. The owner of Matsumotoro was Umeya Shokichi who was the founder Nikkatsu Movie Company and supported Sun Yat-sen for his Independence movement against the Qing Dynasty with his money of one to two trillion Yen converted into current value. Trillion! You can visit Matsumotoro and get lunch there even now. 松本楼http://www.matsumotoro.co.jp/ 梅屋庄吉http://www.matsumotoro.co.jp/umeya.html —

    1944
    December: There was a discussion to cease broadcasting in Korean language.

    —My comment: Mori Arinori who was the first minister of Education in Meiji era proposed to adopt English as the national language for Japan. Shiga Naoya who is a famous novelist proposed to adopt French as the national language just after the WWII. There must have had such a discussion on English in 18 century. Korean cannot say that now, but they did such a discussion either in those days as any people who wanted develop their countries or their lives further. Japan has such a discussion with English even now, apart from whether such change would lead developing or not finally.—Mori Arinori is a key person to understand Japanese education system and the basic laws on the system he made lasted for 54 years until 1940. Someone says his influence lasts even now. He was killed by a political opponent in 1889.

    1945
    8.15 The Emperor’s Announcement
    8.16 Rejected to condemnation by Committee of Nation Building (My comment: led by Communists)
    9.9 Broadcasting in Japanese language was discontinued
    10.2 All the Japanese staff were fired.

    —My comment: Korean people had been well trained and given good positions to operate the broadcasting in spite of immediate discharging all the Japanese staff. —Their personal assets and public assets all were confiscated by the US, Soviet Union and Korea and never returned. They could return themselves to Japan from South Korea with one baggage fortunately. Tyranny by Communists was limited range in South Korea. —In North Korea, the Tyranny against Japanese irrespective of women and children started immediately after the WWII ended. Saito Kiyotaka who was a teacher of a primary school wrote that when he started to escape from North Korea on foot his group was about 100 people. In 74 days later when he finally could cross over the 38 line, his group became 11. —The heart warmed stories for you. Many Korean farmers presented fleeing people warm foods behind arras from Communists and even led them crossing a dark mountain with a torch. Englishmen who had been forced to work in a factory, often protected them against violent Russians and Koreans. You have to review that the US was a good friend of the Soviet Union to understand actions of the Japanese Empire and also review Repression in relation to Tyranny of Mob led by Communists.—

    「流れる星は生きている」Author Fujiwara Tei
    She escaped from North Korea with three children one of whom is Fujiwara Mashiko. He is a famous mathematician and essayist.
    http://www.amazon.co.jp/%E6%B5%81%E3%82%8C%E3%82%8B%E6%98%9F%E3%81%AF%E7%94%9F%E3%81%8D%E3%81%A6%E3%81%84%E3%82%8B-%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%AC%E6%96%87%E5%BA%ABBIBLIO20%E4%B8%96%E7%B4%80-%E8%97%A4%E5%8E%9F-%E3%81%A6%E3%81%84/dp/4122040639

    Chosen Sotokufu’s Text Books written in Korean Language

    For Basic Class
    http://www.geocities.co.jp/SiliconValley-SanJose/4402/shusin2.jpg

    For Upper Class:
    http://www.geocities.co.jp/SiliconValley-SanJose/4402/6-bun.jpg
    This is about Yi Hwang who is a famous Korean Confucian. He influenced Japanese Confucians in Edo era. Check Yi Hwang in the Wikipedia.

    July 25, 2010
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    August 2, 2015
  7. search


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    August 17, 2015

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